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Discretionary Reform 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AS THE ONLY 
EFFECTIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM IN TODAY’S 
POLARIZED CONGRESS 
INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutorial discretion is the authority vested in certain 
officers to select whom to charge and prosecute.1 In response to a 
limitation on resources and overbearing caseloads, the 
government has authorized enforcement officers to refrain from 
using the full scope of their enforcement power.2 As a result, 
enforcement discretion has been exercised upon certain 
individuals who may have redeeming qualities despite having 
violated a law.3 
Although there is no statutory authority for prosecutorial 
discretion in the immigration law context, a series of agency 
statements have recognized its use.4 Most recently, on June 15, 
2012, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano published 
a memorandum setting forth standards for exercising prosecutorial 
discretion for young immigrants who unintentionally violated 
immigration laws when they were brought to the U.S. as minors.5 
Pursuant to this memorandum, the Department of Homeland 
Security, through the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), began accepting applications for Consideration 
of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) on August 15, 
2012.6 Secretary Napolitano’s use of prosecutorial discretion in 
 
 1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 534 (9th ed. 2009). 
 2 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT’L L.J. 243, 244-45 (2010). 
 3 Id. at 244. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, on 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 
States as Children, 1 (June 15, 2012), [hereinafter Napolitano Memo], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who- 
came-to-us-as-children.pdf. 
 6 News Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS Begins 
Accepting Requests for Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (Aug. 15, 
2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-begins-accepting-requests-consideration- 
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals. 
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DACA is a natural outgrowth of the steady increase in the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion within immigration agencies 
since 2000.7 
The approval of prosecutorial discretion was a necessary 
response to Congress’s failure to address the complex issues posed 
by the growing rate of illegal immigration in the United States, 
including the continued separation of loved ones from U.S. citizen 
family members,8 the mandatory detention and deportation of 
criminal aliens,9 and the validity of deporting productive young 
immigrants who have contributed to American society.10 Congress 
has, thus far, failed to enact reform of any kind, such as in the 
refusal to pass the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors (DREAM) Act in December 2010, versions of which have 
sought passage since 2001.11 Legislative gridlock has prevented 
Congress from responding to this problem.12 
Humanitarian interests should naturally be a part of the 
American discussion on immigration reform given the tragic 
circumstances that inform, and arguably compel, many 
immigrants’ decision to come to the United States, with or 
without lawful status.13 For example, asylum and refugee laws 
are an illustration of a deep-rooted belief in humanitarian aid in 
the immigration system.14 In addition, policies with regard to 
 
 7 See generally Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Commissioner of 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, 3 
(Nov. 17, 2000), [hereinafter Meissner Memo], available at http://www.scribd.com/ 
doc/22092970/INS-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Doris-Meissner-11-7-00. 
 8 Cindy Huang, Family Separated by Immigration Woes, Waiting for Reform, 
PBS NEWSHOUR (June 27, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2013/06/ 
family-separated-by-immigration-bill-waiting-for-reform.html. 
 9 US: Mandatory Deportation Laws Harm American Families, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (July 18, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/news/2007/07/17/us-mandatory-deportation- 
laws-harm-american-families. 
 10 See generally Katie Annand, Still Waiting for the Dream: The Injustice of 
Punishing Undocumented Immigrant Students, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 683 (2008). 
 11 Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (“DREAM”) Act, S. 1291, 
107th Cong. (2001); Naftali Bendavid, Dream Act Fails in Senate, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704368004576027570843930428.html; Carl 
Hulse, Senate Democrats put ‘Dream Act’ on Hold, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2010), 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/senate-democrats-put-dream-act-on-hold/.  
 12 This is true in other areas of law as well; much of the dysfunction of our 
current immigration system is due to the inability of the leaders of this nation to come 
to terms with their political inconsistencies and differences. See Wadhia, supra note 2, at 
298; see also A Congress Too Polarized to Protect Itself, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-25/a-congress-too-polarized-to-protect-itself.html; 
see also How Washington’s Dysfunction Harms Economic Growth BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 7, 
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-07/how-washington-s-dysfunction-harms-
economic-growth.html. 
 13 See generally John J. Ammann, No Need for Comprehensive Immigration Reform: 
The Incomplete Compassion of U.S. Immigration Policy, 79 UMKC L. REV. 853, 854 (2011). 
 14 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). 
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victims of domestic violence,15 crimes,16 or human trafficking17 
reinforce this concept. Many of these humanitarian reforms grant 
temporary relief but fail to provide immigrants with much-needed 
stability; very few of them provide permanent residence or a 
pathway to citizenship.18 Even these humanitarian policies have a 
narrow scope and do not address the growing problem of illegal 
immigration to the United States. 
Furthermore, the laws in place to prevent the growth of 
illegal immigration raise serious concerns for the undocumented 
immigrant population. The passage of both the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigrant Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act in 1996 refocused the discourse 
on immigration reform to strengthen border enforcement 
procedures19 and enacted mass mandatory detention and 
deportation of documented and undocumented immigrants 
with criminal convictions.20 As a result, “[j]ust about any 
offense . . . could render the alien deportable.”21 Therefore, the 
humanitarian-based compassion that had been exercised 
toward certain groups of immigrants22 has not been applied to 
the estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the 
nation today.23  
Today’s comprehensive immigration reform debate 
frequently ignores the real, human, and often very young, lives 
that are affected by these laws.24 On the other hand, authorities 
 
 15 Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2000). 
 16 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
114 Stat. 1464-1491 (2000). 
 17 Id. at 1491-1548 (2000). 
 18 Getting a U or T visa, being granted asylum, or adjusting status under 
VAWA is very difficult. See generally Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the Asylum 
Adjudication Process: An Agenda for the Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 
(1993); Greta D. Stoltz, Comment, The U Visa: Another Remedy for Battered Immigrant 
Women, 7 SCHOLAR 127 (2004). 
 19 See generally Ellen G. Yost, Immigration and Nationality Law, 31 INT’L 
LAW. 589, 590 (1997). 
 20 See generally Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 
Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 
1936-38 (2000). 
 21 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALENIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: 
PROCESS AND POLICY 28-29 (7th ed. 2012). 
 22 See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. 
 23 MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION 
STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN 
THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2010, (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2010.pdf. 
 24 Mary Ann Walsh, A Plea for Common Sense and Compassion in the 
Immigration Debate, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
on-faith/wp/2013/08/08/finding-common-sense-and-compassion-in-the-immigration-debate/. 
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have used prosecutorial discretion in the immigration law context 
to address humanitarian concerns for certain immigrant groups.25 
The direction the Obama administration has taken with respect 
to prosecutorial discretion reflects some of the more humanitarian 
values that should play a role in enforcing our immigration laws. 
Ultimately, the most meaningful chance of reform for certain 
immigrant populations may be through prosecutorial discretion.26 
This note argues for the increased use of prosecutorial 
discretion as a temporary and humanitarian measure to 
address immigration reform in lieu of failed legislation. Part I 
of this note provides a short historical discussion of the 
development of prosecutorial discretion within the Department 
of Homeland Security. It also gives a brief overview of the DACA 
program as an exemplary form of prosecutorial discretion. Part 
II compares DACA with Temporary Protected Status, and with 
the amnesty provision of the 1986 Immigration Reform and 
Control Act to elucidate the differences between congressionally 
enacted immigration reform and temporary reform via 
prosecutorial discretion, arguing in favor of the latter. Part III of 
this note discusses the comprehensive immigration reform bill 
that the Senate recently passed to showcase the tensions 
Congress continues to experience with immigration. Part IV 
points to the evolution of prosecutorial discretion as an 
economically efficient, fair, and humanitarian resource, 
advocating that it be maintained as a useful tool within the 
discourse on immigration reform. Finally, this note concludes by 
suggesting that a comprehensive exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion may be, as a temporary measure, more effective in 
reforming immigration laws in today’s volatile political landscape. 
I. THE HISTORY OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
In both administrative and criminal law, prosecutorial 
discretion is a concept that accepts the authority of an agency 
to exercise judgment in determining against whom and when to 
prosecute certain cases. This discretion is partly based on the 
agency’s priorities and resources, and on the underlying purpose 
of the immigration laws.27 Prosecutorial discretion is also an 
 
 25 See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text. 
 26 For a compelling analysis of advocacy through prosecutorial discretion for 
young undocumented immigrants, see M. Aryah Somers, Zealous Advocacy for the 
Right to Be Heard for Children and Youth in Deportation Proceedings, 15 CUNY L. 
REV. 189 (2011). 
 27 Wadhia, supra note 2, at 244. 
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exercise in deciding when not to prosecute, which reflects the 
balance the agency must espouse in deciding who should avail 
themselves of the immigration laws.28 This authority has been 
confirmed and accepted by the Supreme Court, which held that 
“[t]he agency is far better equipped than the courts to deal with 
the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its 
priorities,”29 and that “courts generally will defer to an agency’s 
construction of the statute it is charged with implementing, and 
to the procedures it adopts for implementing that statute.”30 
Top officials from the Department of Homeland Security, 
and formerly the Department of Justice, have recognized and 
accepted prosecutorial discretion as part of the nation’s 
immigration laws.31 The first significant public mention of 
prosecutorial discretion came in the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) Operations Instructions in 1975.32 
The Operation Instructions revealed specific criteria that 
immigration officers were to consider in adjudicating what 
were aptly called “nonpriority” cases.33 Lurking behind this 
murky phrase, prosecutorial discretion became a mysterious 
form of relief in immigration law for many years. In an 
examination of this program, known as “deferred action,”34 
Professor Leon Wildes, did several studies35 of the number of 
cases that were granted and the specific criteria used for these 
affirmations.36 Data from the study showed that USCIS 
repeatedly used seven factors in determining whether to defer 
action in deportation proceedings.37 Particularly, USCIS 
granted deferred action in cases involving: (1) separation of 
family or hardship, (2) the medically infirm, (3) the young, (4) 
the mentally incompetent, (5) potential negative publicity, (6) 
 
 28 Id. at 255. 
 29 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985); see also Chevron USA v. 
Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 30 Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831-32; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 31 See generally Wadhia, supra note 2, at 244. 
 32 See generally Leon Wildes, The Operations Instructions of the Immigration 
Service: Internal Guides or Binding Rules?, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 99 (1979). 
 33 Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 
S.D. L. REV. 819, 820 (2004). 
 34 Deferred action means to literally defer action on deportation so that 
beneficiaries of deferred action have their deportations halted but receive no actual 
legal immigration status. 
 35 See generally Wildes, supra note 32; Leon Wildes, The Nonpriority 
Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Service Goes Public: The Litigative Use 
of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42 (1976). 
 36 Wildes, supra note 33, at 824, 830-32.  
 37 Id. at 830-31, Table 3 & Table 4. 
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victims of domestic violence, and (7) the elderly.38 Wildes 
concluded that the variety of factors used elucidated the 
structured approach the agency took in implementing deferred 
action, though applied mostly in unofficial secrecy.39 
In a more recent study on deferred action, Professor 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia detailed the difficulties she 
experienced in making numerous Freedom of Information Act 
requests to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
and USCIS regarding the current state of the deferred action 
program.40 Professor Wadhia’s 19-month quest revealed that an 
overwhelmingly low number of deferred action cases had been 
granted. “These numbers suggest that the real concern lies in 
the fact that many non-citizens who meet the common criteria 
utilized by the agency in assessing deferred action lack access 
or knowledge about deferred action . . . .”41 Professor Wadhia 
concluded that this was a result of the lack of transparency in 
the program.42 
The criteria from the Operation Instructions of 1975 
were reaffirmed and publicized in a memorandum by former 
Commissioner of INS, Doris Meissner, on November 17, 2000.43 
The Meissner memo identifies a range of possible actions 
undertaken by immigration enforcement officers that fall within 
the ambit of prosecutorial discretion. In particular, the memo 
suggests that prosecutorial discretion can be exercised in a 
proactive manner by granting affirmative immigration relief to 
the extent applicable, such as in the form of deferred action.44  
This is not to say that prosecutorial discretion can be 
used to grant one legal permanent residence or citizenship45—
which can only be conferred through statutory authority—but 
rather, that exercising discretion in deciding not to enforce 
removal may inadvertently grant some temporary immigration 
benefits.46 Emphasizing the finite resources of the INS, the memo 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 See generally Wildes, supra note 33.  
 40 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action 
and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U. N. H. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012). 
 41 Id. at 47. 
 42 See generally id. 
 43 Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 1. 
 44 Id. at 2. 
 45 Id. at 3. 
 46 Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration 
Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 517-18 (2009) (“[T]he Executive still has de facto delegated 
authority to grant relief from removal on a case-by-case basis. The Executive simply 
exercises this authority through its prosecutorial discretion, rather than by evaluating 
eligibility pursuant to a statutory framework at the end of removal proceedings.”) 
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set forth particular standards for immigration officials to consider 
when deciding whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion, such 
as length of residence in the United States, humanitarian 
concerns, lack of resources, and criminal history.47 
Despite a significant reorganization of the immigration 
system following the September 11, 2001 attacks,48 the Meissner 
memo’s endorsement of prosecutorial discretion survived and was 
supplemented by additional policy statements. The most 
significant were a series of memoranda published in March and 
June of 2011 by ICE Director John Morton.49 Morton 
reemphasized the necessity of prosecutorial discretion to 
immigration enforcement and cited several discretionary factors 
in determining its use.50 Acknowledging the historical practice 
of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context,51 the 
June memo emphasized the limited resources of ICE’s 
enforcement powers and stressed that removal operations were 
to focus on the “agency’s enforcement priorities, namely the 
promotion of national security, border security, public safety, 
and the integrity of the immigration system.”52 
Both the Meissner and Morton memos strongly considered 
humanitarian concerns. The Meissner memo, for example, 
explicitly identified humanitarian concerns as a factor in deciding 
whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion. These humanitarian 
 
 47 Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
 48 David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and the Homeland Security Act 
Reorganization: An Early Agenda for Practical Improvements, INSIGHT: MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST., Apr. 2003, available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/ 
insight_4-2003.pdf. 
 49 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was restructured and 
re-named the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE, which fell under 
the Department of Justice, was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security 
on March 1, 2003 as part of the Homeland Security Act. For more detailed analysis on 
this reorganization see id.  
 50 Memorandum from John Morton, Director of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, on Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, 
Detention, and Removal of Aliens, 2 (Mar. 2, 2011), [hereinafter Morton, Civil 
Immigration Enforcement], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/ 
2011/110302washingtondc.pdf; Memorandum from John Morton, Director of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 
Consistent with the Civil Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, 
Detention and Removal of Aliens, 2 (June 17, 2011), [hereinafter Morton, Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/ 
pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. 
 51 Morton refers to numerous agency memoranda discussing prosecutorial 
discretion including a 1976 memo from INS General Counsel Sam Bernsen, the 
aforementioned Meissner Memo, memoranda from William J. Howard, Principal Legal 
Advisor, and Julie L. Myers, Assistant Secretary of ICE, among others. See Morton, 
Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 50, at 1. 
 52 Id. at 2. 
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concerns included medical conditions, family ties in the United 
States and, most notably, whether “an alien entered the United 
States at a very young age” and “whether the alien speaks the 
language or has relatives in the home country.”53 Similarly, the 
June Morton memo noted that “certain classes of individuals” 
warranted particular care in the favorable exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.54 Such classes included “individuals 
present in the United States since childhood,” minors, the 
elderly, veterans, pregnant women, and more.55  
These factors, coupled with the enforcement priorities 
delineated in the March memo, evince the clear weight that 
humanitarian concerns have in determining the appropriate 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. ICE’s enforcement priorities 
were divided into three classifications with an emphasis on 
criminal aliens: Priority 1 for the detention of aliens who pose a 
danger to national security or a risk to public safety; Priority 2 
for recent illegal entrants; Priority 3 for aliens who are fugitives 
or otherwise obstruct immigration controls. This emphasis on 
aliens with criminal convictions highlighted the important 
option of prosecutorial discretion “when dealing with lawful 
permanent residents, juveniles, and the immediate family 
members of U.S. citizens.”56 
Even the White House has turned to prosecutorial 
discretion as a means of addressing some of the humanitarian 
concerns posed by current immigration policies. In response to 
Congress’ refusal to pass the DREAM Act in December 2010,57 
President Barack Obama announced on June 15, 2012, that the 
Department of Homeland Security would begin granting 
temporary relief from deportation to certain young, undocumented 
immigrants.58 Given the aforementioned agency statements 
regarding the use of prosecutorial discretion and President 
Obama’s deferred action announcement,59 Secretary Napolitano 
provided guidelines for extending prosecutorial discretion to certain 
undocumented young immigrants in her memorandum of June 
 
 53 Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 7. 
 54 Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 50, at 5. 
 55 Id. at 5. 
 56 See Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 50, at 1-4. 
 57 See supra note 11. 
 58 News Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Remarks by 
the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012) [hereinafter June 15, 2012 News 
Release], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-
president-immigration. 
 59 Id. 
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15, 2012, under what is now known as the DACA, or Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals, program. 
Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum, like that of its 
predecessors, considered humanitarian concerns in deciding 
when to exercise prosecutorial discretion.60 Secretary 
Napolitano explained that the policies of general enforcement 
of immigration laws “are not designed to be blindly enforced 
without consideration given to the individual circumstances of 
each case. Nor . . . to remove productive young people [who] 
have already contributed to our country in significant ways. 
Prosecutorial discretion, which is used in so many other areas, 
is especially justified here.”61 
Secretary Napolitano set forth specific criteria that every 
applicant must meet and which were delineated by USCIS 
following the memorandum’s publication. In particular, the 
applicant must be: under the age of 31; have entered the United 
States before the age of 16; have continuously resided in the 
United States since June 15, 2007; have been physically present 
in the United States on June 15, 2012; be in school, have 
graduated from high school, or be an honorably discharged 
veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces; and have not been 
convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more 
other misdemeanors.62  
Secretary Napolitano ended the memorandum 
emphasizing that “no substantive right, immigration status or 
pathway to citizenship” would derive from this deferred 
action.63 “Only the Congress, acting through its legislative 
authority, can confer these rights,” the memo noted.64 “It 
remains for the executive branch, however, to set forth policy 
for the exercise of discretion within the framework of the existing 
law.”65 The DACA application, if successfully pursued and 
approved, grants young immigrants a two-year employment 
authorization, which may be renewed.66 
As it stands today, DACA is merely an extension of the 
prosecutorial discretion that was precisely described in the 
 
 60 See generally Napolitano Memo, supra note 5.  
 61 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 62 Id. at 1. 
 63 Id. at 3. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, Consideration of Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 18, 
2013), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals- 
process/frequently-asked-questions. 
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Meissner and Morton memos, with some of the same language 
echoed throughout the new application. DACA gives applicants 
temporary relief from deportation while conferring some stability 
in the form of employment authorization.67 Agency statements on 
prosecutorial discretion have emphasized the importance of 
focusing enforcement power on the agency’s priorities, such as the 
immediate detention of aliens who pose a threat to national 
security and public safety.68 Prosecutorial discretion exists as a 
means to ensure fair results for exactly the kind of immigrants 
that DACA addresses. DACA is a prime example of the 
appropriate use of prosecutorial discretion, and may highlight the 
type of immigration policies that should prevail. 
II. FAILED ATTEMPTS AT IMMIGRATION REFORM 
Although it does not confer permanent immigration 
status, prosecutorial discretion has been a more effective 
mechanism for temporary immigration reform than current 
enacted legislation. To demonstrate this, this section compares 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in DACA with the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and the Temporary 
Protected Status (TPS) provision of the Immigration Act of 1990, 
two congressionally enacted immigration policies that failed to 
meet their goals. By comparing DACA to IRCA and TPS, this 
section seeks to demonstrate that prosecutorial discretion, 
although it does not confer permanent immigration status, is a 
more effective mechanism for temporary immigration reform. 
A. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 198669 
made it illegal for employers to knowingly hire undocumented 
immigrants, and imposed a penalty on those who did not verify 
their employees’ immigration status within three days of their 
hires.70 In addition, IRCA provided amnesty to certain groups 
of undocumented immigrants who could prove their continuous 
 
 67 These are all similar factors that were emphasized for discretionary relief 
in the Morton memo. See Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 50, at 2. 
 68 See generally Meissner Memo, supra note 7; Memorandum from Julie L. 
Myers, Assistant Sec. of Immigr. and Customs Enforcement, on Prosecutorial and 
Custody Discretion (Nov. 7, 2007), [hereinafter Myers Memo], available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092973/ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial-Discretion-Julie-
Myers-11-7-07; Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 50. 
 69 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986). 
 70 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012); see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii). 
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presence in the United States since January 1, 1982,71 as well 
as to certain farm workers under the Special Agricultural 
Worker program.72 The goals of IRCA were to deter illegal 
immigration and protect American workers from wage 
competition with undocumented immigrants.73 The penalty 
imposed on employers who hired undocumented immigrants 
was balanced by an amnesty to the millions of undocumented 
immigrants already in the country.74 According to a study by the 
Migration Policy Institute, the amnesty granted legal status to 
approximately three million undocumented immigrants.75 This did 
not result in a decrease in illegal immigration, however.76 Instead, 
illegal immigration and employment discrimination increased in 
the years following IRCA, defeating the statute’s initial goals.77 
Indeed, many opponents of comprehensive immigration reform 
have used IRCA’s failure to decrease illegal immigration to argue 
against DACA as yet another form of amnesty to another large 
sector of the undocumented population.78 
But unlike IRCA, DACA seeks to prioritize immigration 
enforcement resources by granting a group of young, educated 
and productive members of American society temporary reprieve 
from deportation.79 DACA’s purpose is not to curb illegal 
immigration, but rather to give an affirmative structure to the 
already-utilized mechanism of prosecutorial discretion in granting 
deferral to certain immigrants whom the executive branch 
thought to be both worthy of reprieve and crucial to the 
productivity and cultural fabric of American society.80 IRCA’s 
 
 71 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 72 8 U.S.C. § 1160(g) (2012). 
 73 Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: 
The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 201 (2007). 
 74 Christopher Angevine, Amnesty and the “Legality” of Illegal Immigration: 
How Reliance and Underenforcement Inform the Immigration Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 235, 240 (2008). 
 75 Betsy Cooper & Kevin O’Neil, Lessons from the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986, Policy Brief No. 3, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., Aug. 2005, available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05.pdf; see also Wishnie, 
supra note 73, at 205-06. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Richard A. Johnson, Twenty Years of the IRCA: The Urgent Need for an 
Updated Legislative Response to the Current Undocumented Immigrant Situation in the 
United States, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 239, 251-52 (2007). 
 78 A Reagan Legacy: Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 
4, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128303672. 
 79 Napolitano Memo, supra note 5, at 3. 
 80 See June 15, 2012 News Release supra note 58 (“These are young people 
who study in our schools, they play in our neighborhoods, they’re friends with our kids, 
they pledge allegiance to our flag. . . . [I]t makes no sense to expel talented young 
people. . . who want to staff our labs, or start new businesses, or defend our country. . . 
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amnesty provision, on the other hand, was primarily meant to 
balance strict new sanctions for employers who propagated the 
influx of undocumented immigrants, in the hopes of directly 
curtailing illegal immigration.81 In addition, IRCA’s amnesty 
provision provided a vehicle for undocumented immigrants to 
adjust status and receive legal permanent residence, and 
eventually, citizenship.82 DACA does not and cannot provide 
amnesty. Indeed, the President does not have the power to 
confer such a status adjustment unilaterally.83 
The comparisons between IRCA and DACA stem from 
the significant immigration relief that DACA confers on its 
applicants. But DACA is considerably different than the IRCA 
amnesty. DACA can be more aptly described as a humanitarian 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.84 It aims to maintain the 
benefits of having particular members of society remain in the 
United States, and elicits a closer examination of the types of 
deportations that should be implemented. DACA acknowledges 
the existence of a class of undocumented immigrants that are not 
only productive members of American society, but have their lives 
ingrained in American culture, and often do not remember their 
home country nor have any family there. For these young 
immigrants, the United States is their home country. DACA is 
not a permanent solution, but it is a step toward a more 
humanitarian, efficient, and fair immigration policy. IRCA, on the 
other hand, was another failed attempt by Congress to please 
ideologically opposed factions in the immigration reform debate. 
                                                                                                                                     
these young people are going to make extraordinary contributions, and are already 
making contributions to our society.”). 
 81 Wishnie, supra note 73, at 205-06. 
 82 Id. at 194-95 n.8. 
 83 Congress has delineated the procedures for granting immigration status in 
the Immigration and Nationality Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (2012); Meissner Memo, 
supra note 7, at 3. These procedures cannot be circumvented by the president and the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion does not confer these benefits. See U.S. Const. art. 
II, § 3 (requiring the President to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” even 
when he politically disagrees with Congress).  
 84 The language in DACA can be traced back to the language used in both the 
Meissner and Morton Memos. The emphasis on prioritizing deportations of criminal 
aliens while focusing on humanitarian factors such as young age, length of residency in 
the United States amongst others in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion makes 
DACA consistent with the policies of immigration enforcement expounded since 2000. 
Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 7; Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra 
note 50, at 5. 
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B. Temporary Protected Status (TPS)  
DACA grants temporary status and employment 
authorization to a specified group of undocumented immigrants.85 
Likewise, the Immigration Act of 1990’s Temporary Protected 
Status provision granted power to the Attorney General to 
provide temporary status to immigrants who were unable to 
return to their country due to ongoing armed conflict, 
environmental disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances.86 
TPS is codified under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, and its benefits defined 
as the authorization for “the alien to engage in employment in 
the United States and provide the alien with an ‘employment 
authorized’ endorsement or other appropriate work permit.”87 
TPS arose from a campaign to grant temporary refuge 
to Salvadorans who fled the civil conflict in that country.88 
Focusing on the humanitarian and political concerns of the 
Salvadoran war, Congress chose to extend protection to those who 
fled, granting them a temporary reprieve from deportation and 
legal employment status.89 As the Immigration Act of 1990 
conference report explained, the TPS legislation was meant to 
ensure refuge for Salvadorans who faced civil conflict in their 
home country. The United States’ heavy involvement in the 
Salvadoran conflict carried “responsibilities [of] humanitarian 
concern toward the Salvadorans . . . .”90 Former Democratic 
 
 85 Napolitano Memo, supra note 5, at 2. 
 86 The original text of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b) reads:  
(1) In general The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate 
agencies of the Government, may designate any foreign state (or any part of 
such foreign state) under this subsection only if— (A) the Attorney General finds 
that there is an ongoing armed conflict within the state and, due to such conflict, 
requiring the return of aliens who are nationals of that state to that state (or to 
the part of the state) would pose a serious threat to their personal safety; (B) the 
Attorney General finds that— (i) there has been an earthquake, flood, drought, 
epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, 
but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected, (ii) the foreign 
state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return to the state of aliens 
who are nationals of the state, and (iii) the foreign state officially has requested 
designation under this subparagraph; or (C) the Attorney General finds that there 
exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent 
aliens who are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety, unless 
the Attorney General finds that permitting the aliens to remain temporarily in 
the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1254a (b)(1)(2012). 
 87 Id. § 1254a (a)(1)(B). 
 88 Eva Segerblom, Temporary Protected Status: An Immigration Statute That 
Redefines Traditional Notions of Status and Temporariness, 7 NEV. L. J. 664, 665 (2007). 
 89 Id. 
 90 136 Cong. Rec. S17106-01 (1990) (Statement of Sen. Dennis Deconcini). 
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Senator for Arizona Dennis Deconini added, “I do not believe that 
we should return these individuals to a country immersed in a 
civil war in which we are actively involved.”91 This temporary 
status was granted at the discretion of the Attorney General as 
“essentially an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”92 
Many problems have emerged, however, from the first 
grant of state TPS designation to El Salvador in 1990, to the 
most recent, Syria in 2012. The humanitarian and political 
purposes behind the statute were dwarfed by the rise of gross 
unfairness and limited reprieve to TPS recipients.93 Although 
congressionally enacted, TPS does not confer tangible 
immigration benefits to its recipients. This means that anyone 
who finds himself out of TPS may face deportation, and anyone 
with TPS is unable to ever obtain permanent residence or 
citizenship, or give TPS to immediate family.94 As it stands today, 
TPS grants nationals of a designated foreign state only temporary 
work authorization if they meet certain statutory requirements: 
continuous physical presence from the time of state designation, 
admissibility as an immigrant pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182,95 and 
timely registration during the registration period.96 Furthermore, 
as a function of being employed in the United States, these 
immigrants must pay federal and state taxes,97 but are barred 
from receiving Social Security benefits, which they pay into for 
many years as their state designation is renewed.98 
When a nation continues to suffer from internal conflict 
or environmental disaster, and is time and again re-designated 
under TPS, the beneficiaries of TPS from that nation are left in 
an 18-month limbo.99 The 18-month period may be renewed if the 
country is re-designated under TPS, but it could also be 
terminated. Although eligible to work legally in the United 
States, TPS recipients suffer from gross inequalities and no 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 Susan Martin et al., Temporary Protection: Towards A New Regional and 
Domestic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 543, 548 n.19 (1998). 
 93 Segerblom, supra note 88, at 671. 
 94 Id. 
 95 There are several specified health, criminal, and other grounds of 
inadmissibility for aliens seeking admission as defined under this section of the 
statute. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012); see generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, Temporary Protected Status Eligibility Requirements (last updated June 18, 
2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/tps. 
 96 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c) (2012). 
 97 See Segerblom, supra note 88, at 671. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Temporary Protected Status state designation is re-evaluated every 18 
months. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (b)(3) (2012); Temporary Protected Status Eligibility 
Requirements, supra note 95. 
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pathways to permanently remain in the nation they have worked 
and fostered a life in. When designation is terminated, frequently 
without sensible consideration as to the current condition of the 
designated nation, hundreds of former-TPS recipients face 
deportation, often to a country they no longer recognize.100 As 
described in relation to the termination of TPS for Montserrat,101 
“292 nationals of Montserrat were thrown out of a country they 
had lived in for eight years . . . [T]axes and Social 
Security . . . paid are of no benefit to them now as they are forced 
out of the country. [I]f a national of Montserrat TPS recipient is 
found . . . he will be placed in removal proceedings.”102  
A 2011 study by the Congressional Research Service 
found that there are approximately 217,000 Salvadorans, 
48,000 Haitians, and 66,000 Hondurans currently living in the 
United States under TPS.103 If terminated, deportation 
proceedings would commence for 331,000 individuals. The harsh 
consequences of termination of TPS designation create pockets of 
American immigrant society that are living with a constant fear 
that their immigrant-status will be revoked—a circular kind of 
immigration reform that is inefficient and cold. 
The similarities between TPS and DACA are undeniable. 
Both forms of relief arose from political, humanitarian, or 
economic factors. Both applications grant a temporary reprieve 
from deportation, while conferring employment eligibility on its 
recipients.104 In addition, both TPS and DACA focus on 
particular sectors of the immigrant population, and do not act 
as a comprehensive amnesty provision.105 And both applications 
are granted under strictly discretionary terms, with several 
limiting factors. 
 
 100 Segerblom, supra note 88, at 674-75. 
 101 Montserrat TPS was initially designated in 1997 as a result of an active 
volcano which forced evacuations of more than half the island and destroyed most of its 
infrastructure. Id. at 674.  
 102 Id. 
 103 Ruth Ellen Wassem & Karma Ester, Temporary Protected Status: Current 
Immigration Policy and Issues, Congressional Research Service (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/179582.pdf. 
 104 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Frequently Asked Questions, supra 
note 66; see also Temporary Protected Status Eligibility Requirements, supra note 95. 
 105 TPS affected only aliens who were present in the United States at the time 
their country was designated for protection. Any other national of these designated 
countries who fled after designation was ineligible for TPS. DACA would similarly 
affect young undocumented immigrants who are present in the United States at the 
time of designation, but also aliens under the age of 30, among other specific criteria 
that limits its impact. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Frequently Asked 
Questions, supra note 66; see also Temporary Protected Status Eligibility Requirements, 
supra note 95. 
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Unlike TPS however, DACA confers more than just 
employment authorization and tax-paying obligations. DACA 
recipients are potentially eligible for state benefits such as 
driver’s licenses and in-state college tuition.106 In addition, 
DACA is said to affect a larger population than TPS ever did, 
bringing a significant percentage of young, productive, but 
undocumented, members of American society out of the 
shadows.107 Most significantly though, DACA is a leap in 
American immigration reform because it breaches the barriers 
of congressional stalemates by proactively developing new ways 
to fix the immigration system. Although DACA may result in 
injustices similar to those created by termination of a TPS 
designation, DACA’s strength lies in the fact that it is not 
solely a humanitarian policy (as TPS was) but rather a 
progressive recognition that not all undocumented immigrants 
should be turned away.108  
Between August 2012 and August 2013, USCIS 
accepted 567,563 applications for DACA, of which 455,455 were 
approved.109 A study conducted by the Immigration Policy 
Center has found that 61% of DACA recipients have obtained a 
new job and 54% opened their first bank account.110 Also, in the 
study, “Ninety-four percent of survey respondents indicated that 
they would apply for citizenship if ever eligible. This finding 
 
 106 These benefits will vary by state and have already been blocked by several 
states such as Arizona, Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. This note does not seek to 
discuss state-specific DACA benefits but rather to elucidate the potential for greater 
reform through DACA in contrasting it with TPS. See David Adams & Alex 
Dobuzinskis, Battle Far From Over for US Immigrants Who Get Deferrals, REUTERS, 
Aug. 18, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/18/us-usa-
immigration-dreamers-idUSBRE87H01A20120818. 
 107 Jeffrey Passel and Mark Hugo Lopez, Up to 1.7 Million Unauthorized 
Immigrant Youth May Benefit from New Deportation Rules, PEW HISPANIC CTR. (Aug. 14, 
2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/08/14/up-to-1-7-million-unauthorized-immigrant- 
youth-may-benefit-from-new-deportation-rules/; see supra note 100 and accompanying 
text (detailing current numbers of TPS recipients).  
 108 Prosecutorial discretion focuses on the economic efficiency and viability of 
enforcement priorities. Although DACA is certainly an economics-based exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, it is also undeniably humanitarian in its focus on young 
groups of undocumented immigrants. The language used in Secretary Napolitano’s 
memorandum along with President Obama’s announcement exudes humanitarian 
considerations. See generally Napolitano Memo, supra note 5, at 2; June 15, 2012 News 
Release, supra note 58.  
 109 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival Statistics, Data on Individual 
Applications and Petitions, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Sept. 15, 2013, 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/I
mmigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%20Types/DACA/daca-13-9-11.pdf.  
 110 Roberto G. Gonzalez & Veronica Terriquez, How DACA is Impacting the 
Lives of Those Who Are Now DACAmented: Preliminary Findings from the National 
UnDACAmented Research Project, Figure 1, Aug. 2013, http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/ 
sites/default/files/docs/daca_final_ipc_csii_1.pdf. 
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suggests that DACA recipients seek to be further integrated into 
U.S. society.”111 Beyond humanitarian inclinations, DACA is 
more effective than TPS because it implicitly values the benefits 
to American society that DACA beneficiaries contribute. It also 
provides a temporary solution in order to push forward 
legislation that provides a more permanent fix. 
III. COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM TODAY  
In light of changing immigration policies, on June 27, 
2013, the United States Senate passed S.744, the “Border 
Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization 
Act,”112 the most significant and moderate immigration legislation 
to come before Congress in recent years.113 A bipartisan group of 
eight senators from both Republican and Democratic parties, 
known as the “Gang of Eight,” wrote the Bill to address the 
issues in immigration that so clearly divide Congress.114  
The Bill suggests both increased border security and 
granting some form of relief to undocumented immigrants. It 
slightly modifies the family- and employment-based categories 
for immigrants in the Immigration and Nationality Act,115 
creates a new category of merit-based immigrant visas,116 and 
more controversially, grants a pathway to citizenship, albeit a 
long one, to the 11 million undocumented immigrants living in 
the United States today.117 In the statement of congressional 
findings, the Senators describe the underlying intent of the 
Bill: “As a Nation, we have the right and responsibility to make 
 
 111 Id. at 2. 
 112 United States Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 1st Session, Vote 
Summary, SENATE.GOV (June 27, 2013), available at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/ 
LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1&vote=00168. 
 113 Ashley Parker & Jonathan Martin, Senate, 68 to 32, Passes Overhaul for 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/us/politics/ 
immigration-bill-clears-final-hurdle-to-senate-approval.html?smid=pl-share.  
 114 See generally Rachel Weiner, Immigration’s Gang of 8: Who are they?, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2013/01/28/immigrations-gang-of-8-who-are-they/; see generally also Parker & 
Martin, supra note 113. 
 115 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization 
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. §§ 2305-23 & 4102-05 (2013). 
 116 Id. §§ 2301-02 (under “Subtitle C – Future Immigration”). 
 117 Id. §§ 2101-02 (where Chapter 5 of title II of 8 U.S.C. § 1255 et seq. is 
amended by inserting Section 245B regarding “Adjustment of Status of Eligible 
Entrants before December 31, 2011, to that of Registered Provisional Immigrant” and 
where Chapter 5 of title II of 8 U.S.C. § 1255 is amended by inserting section 245C 
regarding “Adjustment of Status of Registered Provisional Immigrants”); Immigration 
Reform, Finally, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/ 
opinion/immigration-reform-finally.html. 
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our borders safe, to establish clear and just rules for seeking 
citizenship, to control the flow of legal immigration, and to 
eliminate illegal immigration, which in some cases has become 
a threat to our national security.”118 
Title I of the Bill addresses border security enhancements, 
which serve as “triggers” for other reforms before they are 
implemented.119 These enhancements include the Comprehensive 
Southern Border Security Commissions and Southern Border 
Fencing Strategy, which are executed by creating an additional 
independent fund to implement the Act.120 The border security 
strategies act as a trigger to several provisions, including the 
Registered Provisional Immigrant Program (RPI), which would 
allow eligible undocumented immigrants to apply if they have 
been in the United States since December 31, 2011, have no 
significant criminal record, pay taxes, pass background checks, 
and pay the application and penalty fee.121 RPI status would 
permit work authorization and protection from deportation for 
six years.122 Despite this, RPI status does not grant eligibility for 
federal public benefits.123 Eventually, an RPI may adjust status 
to that of a legal permanent resident after he or she gets to the 
“Back of the Line”:  
The status of a registered provisional immigrant may not be 
adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence under this section until after the Secretary of State 
certifies that immigrant visas have become available for all approved 
petitions for immigrant visas that were filed under sections 201 and 
203 before the date of the enactment of the Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act.124 
In addition to RPI status, the Bill also provides for other 
forms of legalization including a Merits-Based Point System 
which allows foreigners to obtain lawful permanent residence 
in the United States based on points relating to their skills, 
employment history, and education.125 
The White House released a statement by President 
Obama following the Senate’s passage of the bill: “The 
bipartisan bill that passed today was a compromise. By 
 
 118 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization 
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2. 
 119 Id. § 3. 
 120 Id. §§ 4-5. 
 121 Id. § 2101(b). 
 122 Id. § 2101(d)(1).  
 123 Id. § 2101(d)(3).  
 124 Id. § 2102(c)(2). 
 125 Id. § 2301. 
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definition, nobody got everything they wanted . . . . Today, the 
Senate did its job. It’s now up to the House to do the same.”126 
S.744 currently finds itself mired in congressional stalemate, 
where the Republican majority in the House of Representatives 
refuses to address the bill.127 As of September 2013, the House 
has yet to consider the Senate bill, leaving millions of 
undocumented immigrants waiting for reform.128 
IV. THE VARIOUS BENEFITS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION  
Given Congress’ inability to effectuate immigration 
reform, prosecutorial discretion could be a mechanism to 
educate and inform our leaders of the benefits of retaining 
certain groups of undocumented immigrants. The benefits of 
immigration have been consistently recognized in the immigration 
reform debate. According to the CATO Institute’s Policy 
Recommendations for the 108th Congress, “Immigration gives 
America an economic edge in the global economy . . . . Immigrants 
are not a drain on government finances . . . . [T]he typical 
immigrant and his or her offspring will pay a net $80,000 more in 
taxes during their lifetimes than they collect in government 
services.”129 Similarly, the Center for Immigration Studies has 
recognized the correlation between increased education in 
immigrant populations, higher paying jobs, and increased tax 
revenue, which all serve as benefits to American society.130  
In advocating for the passage of the DREAM Act, 
supporters cited to the Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe, 
where the Court held that undocumented immigrant youths 
are entitled to free public school education from kindergarten 
through high school.131 The reasoning behind this decision was 
 
 126 News Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement 
by President Obama on Senate Passage of Immigration Reform (June 27, 2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/27/statement-president- 
obama-senate-passage-immigration-reform-0. 
 127 Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, Republicans in House Resist 
Overhaul for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/07/11/us/politics/gop-in-house-resists-overhaul-for-immigration.html?smid=pl-share. 
 128 Michael D. Shear & Julia Preston, Immigration Reform Falls to the Back of 
the Line, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/us/politics/ 
immigration-reform-falls-to-the-back-of-the-line.html?smid=pl-share. 
 129 Cato Institute, The Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations 
for the 108th Congress, (Sept. 1, 2003), available at http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/ 
files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2003/9/hb108-63.pdf. 
 130 Steven A. Camarota, The High Cost of Cheap Labor: Illegal Immigration and 
the Federal Budget, CTR. IMMIGR. STUDS., 23 (2004), available at http://www.cis.org/ 
sites/cis.org/files/articles/2004/fiscal.pdf. 
 131 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). 
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that undocumented children had committed no crime, and should 
not be punished for the crimes of their parents.132 Further, the 
Court emphasized the need to educate undocumented immigrant 
children because, “by denying these children a basic education, we 
deny them the ability to live within the structure of our civic 
institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will 
contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our 
Nation.”133 The children of undocumented immigrants will 
continue to be part of American society. Today’s immigration 
system should encourage the American government to take the 
steps necessary for the U.S. to legally accept them.134 
Policy statements from top-ranking immigration 
officials prior to Obama’s DACA program conveyed a similar 
philosophy. As previously discussed, the Meissner memo on the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion discretely weaves into the 
classic economic concerns of the agency’s enforcement priorities 
an emphasis on humanitarian concerns. In describing the 
development of a list of “triggers” to help INS District Directors 
identify suitable cases for the favorable exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, Meissner identifies factors such as “Aliens with 
lengthy presence in United States (i.e., 10 years or more)” and 
“Aliens present in the United States since childhood.”135 The 
memo concludes that these trigger facts are meant to facilitate 
“identification of potential cases that may be suitable for 
prosecutorial review as early as possible in the process.”136 
Through the early targeting of individuals that should receive a 
favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the agency 
spends its resources on the crucial enforcement priorities of 
criminal aliens while reaffirming that the deportation of 
certain individuals should be reassessed. 
Similarly, an October 2005 memorandum by Principal 
Legal Advisor to ICE, William J. Howard, regarding the necessity 
of prosecutorial discretion for the agency’s enforcement priorities, 
combined the concern of prioritizing enforcement with the 
humanitarian necessity for prosecutorial discretion.137 After 
 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 223. 
 134 See Annand supra note 10, at 709 (advocating for passage of DREAM act 
given reality that DREAMers will continue to be part of American society).  
 135 Meissner Memo, supra note 7, at 11. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal Legal Advisor of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, on Prosecutorial Discretion, 4-6 (Oct. 24, 2005), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/22092975/ICE-Guidance-Memo-Prosecutorial- 
Discretion-William-J-Howard-10-24-05. 
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detailing the various instances and manners of exercising 
prosecutorial discretion throughout the lifetime of an immigration 
case, a discussion that is peppered with considerable 
humanitarian factors,138 Howard concluded the memorandum by 
stressing that prosecutorial discretion was a “very significant tool” 
that should be used in “cases involving human suffering and 
hardship.”139 He added: “our reasoned determination in making 
prosecutorial discretion decisions can be a significant benefit to 
the efficiency and fairness of the removal process.”140 Likewise, in 
a November 2007 memorandum discussing prosecutorial 
discretion, written by Assistant Secretary of ICE Julie Myers, 
compassion and family unity were stressed as important factors 
in considering whether to take nursing mothers into custody.141 
Attached to the Myers memo was the original memorandum on 
prosecutorial discretion of INS Commissioner Doris Meissner. 
Finally, the memoranda published by Director of ICE 
John Morton in 2011 also joined the economic goals of the 
agency’s enforcement priorities with significant humanitarian 
factors to determine the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
First, the memorandum of March 2011 set out enforcement 
priorities by creating specific and distinguishable categories: 
aliens who pose a threat to national security (priority 1); aliens 
who recently reentered the United States illegally (priority 2); 
and aliens who are fugitives (priority 3).142  
Given the explicit categories created for enforcement 
priorities, and the rise in criminal aliens, Morton emphasized 
that prosecutorial discretion should be soundly exercised, and 
that “particular care should be given when dealing with lawful 
permanent residents, juveniles, and the immediate family 
members of U.S. citizens.”143 Morton’s June 2011 memorandum 
reemphasized these priorities, building on previous agency 
memoranda,144 and specifically delineating factors to be 
considered when issuing a favorable exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion—factors with an emphasis on humanitarian interests 
and an implicit acknowledgement of the positive impact of certain 
individuals on American society.145 These factors include the 
alien’s length of time in the United States, circumstances of his 
 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 8. 
 140 Id. (emphasis added). 
 141 See Myers Memo, supra note 68, at 1. 
 142 Morton, Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 50, at 1-2. 
 143 Id. at 4. 
 144 Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 50, at 1. 
 145 Id. at 4. 
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or her arrival (particularly if he or she arrived as a young child) 
and the person’s pursuit of education in the United States.146 
Recognizing the benefits derived from the retention of 
certain immigrants who have the potential to positively impact 
American society has resonated throughout the recent political 
discourse on immigration reform—sometimes even on both 
sides of the political spectrum. For instance, at the 2012 
Republican National Convention, former Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice expressed this same ideology: “We must 
continue to welcome the world’s most ambitious people to be a 
part of us. In that way, we stay young and optimistic and 
determined. We need immigration laws that protect our borders, 
meet our economic needs, and yet show that we are a 
compassionate nation of immigrants.”147 Similarly, the New 
York Times quoted Republican Senator from Florida Marco 
Rubio saying that legislation for immigration reform “should 
also recognize that legal immigration has been a boon to the 
United States in the past and is ‘critical to our future.’”148 Some 
Democratic leaders have even been arrested in the name of 
immigration reform.149 
It is clear from the evolution of the above-cited policy 
memoranda that consideration of the favorable exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion both addresses the economic necessity 
of enforcement priorities (given the limited resources of the 
agencies), and balances humanitarian concerns for fair and 
compassionate immigration laws. At the same time, use of 
prosecutorial discretion also provides an opportunity to 
individually identify and provide relief to those immigrants who 
contribute positively to the economic and cultural fabric of 
American society. Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum regarding 
the use of prosecutorial discretion as a relief tool for certain 
young immigrants is an extension of the aforementioned policy 
which has been utilized by the DHS since the Meissner memo. 
 
 146 Id. 
 147 Condoleezza Rice, Former Secretary of State, Address to Republican 
National Convention (Aug. 29, 2012), transcript available at http://www.foxnews.com/ 
politics/2012/08/29/transcript-condoleezza-rice-speech-at-rnc/#ixzz2HmLITSNl. 
 148 Julia Preston, Rubio Pushes His Party on Immigration Changes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/us/politics/marco-rubio-pushes-
republican-party-on-immigration-changes.html?hp&_r=0. 
 149 Julia Preston, 8 Lawmakers Arrested at Immigration Protest, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/09/us/8-lawmakers-arrested-at-immigration-
protest.html. 
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CONCLUSION 
Despite the best efforts of certain members of Congress 
to find common ground and pass comprehensive immigration 
reform, little progress has been made. Eleven million 
undocumented immigrants continue to live in the shadows, 
contributing to the growth of the American economy yet are 
consistently marginalized and ignored. It is through the 
mechanism of prosecutorial discretion that comprehensive, 
efficient, and humanitarian immigration reform can be 
effectuated. Given the adjudicative nature of the mechanism, the 
DACA program would have the potential to affect many eligible 
noncitizens. This may explain why the agency initially failed to 
offer proper guidelines for the use of deferred action.150 The 
Morton memos clearly evince a greater care in the transparent 
use of prosecutorial discretion under the Obama administration. 
Although these agency statements have addressed some of the 
problems that were prevalent with deferred action, the intense 
opposition to comprehensive immigration reform is worrisome. 
Over the years, although acknowledging the need for 
serious reform, Congress has been unable to agree on granting 
relief to hardworking, though undocumented, members of 
American society. Yet, the economic and cultural benefits of 
these productive members of American society have been 
unequivocally demonstrated.151 Prosecutorial discretion calls for 
fair humanitarian policies in addition to the need for economic 
and administrative efficiency. And, given congressional gridlock 
in immigration reform, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, of 
which DACA is an exemplary illustration, has been and can be 
effectively used as a temporary measure to relieve certain 
undocumented immigrants from the unfair immigration policies 
of our time. 
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